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CONSUMER-DRIVEN REFORM OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT NEW 
AMENDMENTS TO THE HIGHER 
EDUCATION ACT 
Julie Margetta Morgan  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
American higher education is a lot like global warming. 
Public policy has come to it too late with too little to matter 
much. Thank God we still have capitalism and evolution to 
save us. 
-  Joe Hagy, retired educator (February 15, 2008) 
 
In 1978, Walter C. Hobbs set out to survey the burgeoning 
field of regulatory provisions governing higher education.
1
 He set 
forth a series of questions to be used by scholars to evaluate 
regulations imposed by the federal government upon higher 
education: ―What are the regulatory agencies seeking to 
accomplish? Is that legitimate? Is it wise?‖ and ―What are the 
probable consequences (intended or not) for academe? What is, 
what can be, and what should be higher education’s response?‖2 
The federal government’s regulatory power over higher education 
has expanded considerably since those questions were penned, 
                                                        
  J.D., Boston College. Doctoral candidate, Higher Education, Boston 
College Lynch School of Education. I am deeply grateful to Christopher Morgan 
and Diana Pullin for thoughtful comments on previous drafts. 
1 See Walter C. Hobbs, The Theory of Government Regulation, in 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 5–7 (Walter C. Hobbs 
ed., 1978). 
2 Id. at 5. 
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further emphasizing the need to answer them.
3
 This Article revives 
Hobbs’ inquiries to examine the consumer-information provisions 
of the amendments to the Higher Education Act, focusing in 
particular on the goals they seek to accomplish and their potential 
impact.
4
 
As Congress began to seriously approach the reauthorization of 
the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 2007 and 2008, it faced a 
policy landscape that had long been defined by the ongoing 
commitments to broadening access to college and making tuition 
more affordable, but was significantly altered by some unforeseen 
obstacles.
5
 One major development was New York Attorney 
General Andrew Cuomo’s 2007 investigation into the relationships 
between colleges and student loan companies that uncovered the 
improper use of incentives to attain ―preferred lender‖ status at 
many institutions.
6
 The investigation received much public 
attention and resulted in further investigation at the federal level, 
as well as legislation that cut federal subsidies to lenders.
7
 Later in 
that same year, the student loan industry took center stage again, as 
the mortgage crisis that crippled the housing market bled over into 
a ―credit crunch‖ in student lending.8 Major lenders like Nelnet 
scaled back the types of student loans they offer, and others ceased 
offering loans altogether, prompting Congress both to provide 
relief to lenders and increase the scale of its direct lending 
program.
9
  
                                                        
3 See, e.g., Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus 
Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2008); Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2008). 
4 See infra Parts II–VIII. 
5 See Ami Zusman, Issues Facing Higher Education in the Twenty-first 
Century, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 109, 109–22 
(Philip Altbach, et al., eds., 1999); Kelly Field, Congress Prepares for Student-
Loan Crisis, While Declaring It Unlikely, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28, 
2008, at A22; Jonathan Glater, Cuomo Investigates Colleges and Ties to Student 
Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at B6.  
6 See Glater, supra note 5. 
7 See College Cost Reduction Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 
784 (2007). 
8 See Field, supra note 5. 
9 See Paul Basken, Loan-Rescue Plan Has Hidden Costs, Benefits, CHRON. 
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These circumstances made affordability a driving factor in new 
federal legislation, and also raised concerns about the 
trustworthiness of our nation’s colleges when it comes to 
safeguarding the financial well-being of students and families.
10
 
This distrust is reflected in the amendments to the HEA (contained 
in the Higher Education Opportunity Act) through provisions that 
regulate the relationship between financial aid officers and loan 
companies, and also in those that force institutions of higher 
learning to provide detailed information about the costs and quality 
of higher education to students and families.
11
 The reauthorization 
of the HEA continues to support higher education by providing 
financial aid to students, but it also reflects a new strategy: 
changing higher education by empowering consumers.
12
  
The amendments to the HEA purport to ease the financial 
burden of college by decreasing the price of higher education and 
helping families to plan better to pay for college.
13
 The methods 
for achieving these goals emphasize providing more and better 
sources of information about college admissions, cost, financial 
aid, and the terms of student loans.
14
 They include loan 
information provisions that have been termed a ―College 
Consumer’s Bill of Rights,‖15 as well as plans for a net price 
calculator, tuition watch lists, expanded reporting on institutional 
characteristics, and incentives to colleges and non-profits to target 
cost and admissions information to students and families.
16
  
                                                        
HIGHER EDUC., June 6, 2008, at A4; Field, supra note 5. 
10 See Paul Fain, Why Colleges Can’t Shake the Feds, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., July 4, 2008, at A3; H. COMM. ON ED. AND LABOR, 110th CONG., THE 
COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY AND AFFORDABILITY ACT: THE COLLEGE CONSUMER’S 
BILL OF RIGHTS (Feb. 2008), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/ 
publications/20080207CCBillofRights.pdf [hereinafter COLLEGE CONSUMER’S 
BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
11 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, §§ 1001–
1042, 122 Stat. 3078, 3478–90 (2008). 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id.  
15 See id.; COLLEGE CONSUMER’S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10. 
16 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 111,  
122 Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015); College 
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Representative Buck McKeon described the House of 
Representative’s proposed amendments to the HEA as an effort to 
capitalize on market principles at work in higher education: ―Our 
principles for reform are based on the idea that by giving good 
information to consumers, we can empower them to exert 
influence on the marketplace.‖17 The idea that the answer to rising 
costs and limited affordability for middle- and low-income 
students is a question of manipulating the higher education market 
is not a new one.
18
 In the past, the federal government has 
enhanced student choice by providing direct financial aid to 
students in the hopes that increased choice would promote 
competition in the higher education market, which would increase 
efficiency, quality, and affordability.
19
 Student aid increases have 
affected affordability positively in the sense that low-income 
students are able to attend more costly institutions, but aid 
increases may have had the unintended negative effect of allowing 
the price of higher education to rise unchecked.
20
  
The position taken in this Article is not that helping consumers 
become more informed is inherently bad. Rather, it is the author’s 
contention that this policy and rhetorical shift toward solving 
problems by ―empowering consumers‖ that has so far succeeded 
unchallenged, can be dangerous if its consequences are unknown.
21
 
Indeed, the responsibility for providing access and affordability is 
shifted away from the government and institutions, and is instead 
                                                        
Cost Reduction Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2008). 
17 Howard P. McKeon, Real Progress (Finally) on College Affordability, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com 
/views/2008/02/07/mckeon; Press Release, H. Comm. on Ed. and Labor, 
McKeon Statement: Conference Report to H.R. 4137, the ―Higher Education 
Opportunity Act‖ (July 31, 2008), available at http://republicans.edlabor. 
house.gov/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=691.  
18 See Larry Leslie & Gary Johnson, The Market Model and Higher 
Education, 45 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 1–2 (1974). 
19 See id. at 6. 
20 See Sandy Baum, College Education: Who Can Afford It?, in THE 
FINANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE 
39, 39–52 (Michael B. Paulsen & John C. Smart, eds., 2001).  
21 See infra Part VIII. 
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placed on students and families.
22
 Without any indication that 
greater consumer information will in fact lead to better consumer 
choices, better access and better affordability, a political rhetoric 
that glorifies consumer choice at the expense of much-needed 
focus on assisting families in paying for higher education could 
hurt students, especially low-income ones.
23
 
This Article discusses the consumer information sections of the 
amendments to the HEA as well as their theoretical basis and 
likelihood of success.
24
 Section II begins by observing the 
historical precedents for federal involvement in higher education 
policy.
25
 Sections III and IV set the stage for the policy shifts 
contained in the HEA reauthorization by highlighting the emerging 
educational policy themes of accountability and consumerism and 
discussing the key conclusions and recommendations made by 
Margaret Spellings’ 2006 Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education.
26
 Section V describes the proposed amendments to the 
HEA and their intended effects, gleaned from comments by 
leading policymakers.
27
 Section VI examines the economic 
theories that underlie efforts to increase competition in higher 
education.
28
 Section VII points to analogous attempts to increase 
consumer choice in k-12 education and graduate teacher 
preparation programs, and the results of those efforts.
29
  
II.  THE FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY 
In order to understand the goals to be fulfilled through the 
consumer information amendments to the HEA and the context 
under which they were passed, this section will provide a historical 
background of the role of Congress in supporting higher 
                                                        
22 See, e.g., Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 
§ 111, 122 Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015). 
23 See infra Part VIII. 
24 See infra Part V. 
25 See infra Part II. 
26 See infra Parts III–IV. 
27 See infra Part V. 
28 See infra Part VI. 
29 See infra Part VII. 
MORGAN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:51 PM 
536 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
education.
30
 It is neither practicable nor necessary to detail every 
congressional action that has affected higher education. Rather, 
highlighting the events that have had the most substantial effect on 
the federal role in postsecondary education is sufficient to show 
that it evolved incrementally as a response to a variety of 
circumstances, and any future policies must work within the 
framework set up more out of necessity than long-term planning.  
The responsibility to provide for public education has been 
traditionally left to the states,
31
 so the federal government has 
always had what could be considered a secondary role in both k-12 
and higher education.
32
 At its core, the relationship remains one 
based upon the provision of resources and the expected return of a 
myriad of benefits to society.
33
 From the inception of the system of 
higher education in America, colleges and universities, both public 
and private, have received funding from the government, whether 
it was from the crown, the colony, the state, or the federal 
government.
34
 Even from the earliest of days, however, the 
provision of support has not been purely beneficent; it has served 
important federal policy goals.
35
  
In the 1800s, while American colleges were still in their 
infancy, the federal government furthered higher education in its 
new states by providing its most readily available asset: land.
36
 
                                                        
30 See infra text accompanying notes 31–78. 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
32 See Lawrence Gladieux & Jacqueline King, The Federal Government 
and Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 151, 152 (Philip Altbach et al. eds., 1999). 
33 See JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
TRANSITION 219–37 (1997); Robben Fleming, Who Will Be Regulated, and 
Why?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 11, 15 (Walter C. 
Hobbs ed., 1978). 
34 See GEORGE RAINSFORD, CONGRESS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 3 (1972); JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 12–13 (2004). 
35 See Patrick M. Callan, Reframing Access and Opportunity: Problematic 
State and Federal Higher Education Policy in the 1990s, in THE STATES AND 
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY 84 (Donald E. Heller ed., 2001); Fleming, 
supra note 33, at 15. 
36 BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 227. 
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Prior to 1862, grants of land were made without significant 
conditions and for the purpose of inciting interest in the purchase 
of federally owned land in western territories.
37
 The Morrill Land 
Grant Act of 1862 changed that; the Act endowed states with land 
taken from the public domain for the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining colleges, with specific conditions: to teach primarily 
agricultural and mechanical arts, and also to provide military 
training.
38
 The Morrill land grants were a response to 
dissatisfaction with the liberal arts education available in America 
at the time; legislators recognized that the country’s ability to 
compete with the rest of the world depended upon the development 
of knowledge in both agricultural and mechanical arenas.
39
  
From the first Morrill Act onward, federal support of higher 
education has been conditioned in such a way as to not only assist 
in the spread of higher learning, but also to achieve certain other 
public policy goals.
40
 For instance, the Morrill Act of 1890 
extended funding to land grant colleges on a yearly basis, but it 
required that institutions receiving funding would not refuse 
education based upon race.
41
 Targeting grants for the development 
of agricultural and mechanical fields shows the government’s 
intent to shape the course of American higher education so that it 
might serve the needs of the country and its citizens for economic 
growth, defense, or social wellbeing.
42
 The condition that 
institutions admit students of all races, however, indicates a 
                                                        
37 See id. Alice Rivlin and George Rainsford indicate that the provision of 
land in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s was due to a desire to sell public lands 
in new territories quickly, rather than to a desire to promote education. The land 
was granted for the establishment of schools, but evidently the hope was that the 
schools would help attract settlers to the newly established states. See 
RAINSFORD, supra note 34, at 39–54; ALICE M. RIVLIN, THE ROLE OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (1961).  
38 See Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. § 301 (2008). 
39 See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 227. 
40 See id. at 219–37; Callan, supra note 35, at 84; Fleming, supra note 33, 
at 15. 
41 See Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. § 322 (2008). The 
education need not be provided in an integrated environment in order to comply 
with this provision. See id. 
42 See Callan, supra note 35, at 84. 
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different kind of goal: the government sought to change its system 
of higher education so that it reflected attributes essential to a 
democratic society such as equal opportunity for all citizens.
43
 
The twentieth century brought a more firm commitment by the 
federal government to the support of higher education.
44
 The 
patchwork grants and financial support of the 1800s and early 
1900s left open the question of whether federal support could be 
expected to continue and how it would be administered.
45
 The 
congressional response to this question was shaped in part by 
circumstance and in part by the vigilant protection of the power of 
the states to control education, resulting in the establishment of 
two major channels of support: research grants and student 
financial aid.
46
 Financing for research projects began in the late 
1800s, but a federal commitment to supporting research in a 
university setting, particularly on issues of national defense, arose 
out of the military needs of the First and Second World Wars.
47
 
Vannevar Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier argued 
successfully for the continuation of funding for scientific research 
in peacetime; today, many of Bush’s suggestions have taken shape 
in real organizations that fund higher education research, such as 
the National Institute of Health, the National Science Foundation, 
and the National Endowment for the Arts, as well as large research 
grants from federal departments like the Departments of Defense, 
Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services.
48
 
Although targeted research grants satisfied the federal 
government’s need to further national objectives like technological 
                                                        
43 See John Thelin, Higher Education and the Public Trough, in PUBLIC 
FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION 21, 37 (Edward St. John & Michael Parsons 
eds., 2004).  
44 See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 219; THELIN, supra note 34, 
at 32–33. 
45 See Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. § 301 (2008); Morrill 
Land Grant Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. § 322 (2008); Hatch Act of 1887, 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 361a–361h (2008). 
46 See THELIN, supra note 34, at 23. 
47 See id. at 29. 
48 See VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE: THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945); 
CONSTANCE EWING COOK, LOBBYING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 6–7 (1998); 
THELIN, supra note 34, at 32.  
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advancement and national defense, they do not address the ―social 
goals‖ such as equal access and more equitable distribution of 
wealth.
49
 President Truman addressed these social goals in 1946 by 
convening a commission to examine the feasibility of expanding 
educational opportunities to all eligible students.
50
 The resulting 
report, Higher Education for American Democracy, laid down the 
rationale and groundwork for expanding access to higher 
education, but failed to provide any roadmap for how Congress or 
any other federal branch should facilitate expansion.
51
 Colleges 
and universities would need substantial financial support to 
accommodate the broad access counseled in the Truman 
Commission Report, yet it was not clear that this support would 
come from the federal government.
52
 In order to realize expansion 
of opportunity in postsecondary education, Congress would have 
to overcome the same constitutional and political objections it had 
faced since the 1700s, when President Washington lobbied for the 
creation of a national university.
53
  
Although Congress balked at the idea of expanding federal 
support in the 1940s, the political wherewithal to expand 
educational opportunity surfaced through changing circumstances 
over the next two decades.
54
 In the mid-1940s, Congress faced the 
impending return of World War II veterans and pressure to make a 
smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy.
55
 To 
delay the entry of servicemen into the workforce and give industry 
time to recover, legislators created incentives for veterans to take 
part in postsecondary education.
56
 The Servicemen’s Readjustment 
                                                        
49 See Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18, at 105–06. 
50 See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER 
EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: VOL. I (1947); THELIN, supra note 34, 
at 268. 
51 See THELIN, supra note 34, at 269.  
52 See id.  
53 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; RAINSFORD, supra note 34, at 18–20; 
THELIN, supra note 34, at 153–54. 
54 See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 
(1965); BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 235. 
55 See THELIN, supra note 34, at 262–63. 
56 See id. 
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Act (―G.I. Bill‖) gave veterans the opportunity to go to college 
tuition-free for a certain period of time at any federally-approved 
institution.
57
 The G.I. Bill introduced the concept of national, 
student-centered support for higher education.
58
 The key feature of 
such a program was that the funds were portable; that is, the 
funding traveled with the student to whichever federally-approved 
college the student chose.
59
 Lawmakers expected the response to 
the G.I. Bill to be minimal, but in fact, by 1946, more than one 
million G.I. Bill students were enrolled in institutions of higher 
education.
60
 The Russian launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 
lent even more urgency to the cause of supporting higher 
education, as policymakers moved toward a program that would 
ensure excellence in American production of knowledge with bills 
like the National Defense Education Act.
61
  
The Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 was the first 
comprehensive federal program of financial assistance to colleges 
and students.
62
 It borrowed from the G.I. Bill to create substantial 
support for higher education that provided the greatest amount of 
individual choice for students, while skirting dissension based 
upon impeding colleges’ and universities’ self-determination.63 
The central focus of the 1965 HEA was providing aid to 
undergraduate students ―of exceptional financial need,‖ in the form 
of educational opportunity grants, student loans, work-study 
grants, and fellowships for students who intended to become 
elementary and secondary school teachers.
64
 Like the G.I. Bill, the 
                                                        
57 See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 
284 (1944). 
58 See id. 
59 See Pub. L. No. 346; THELIN, supra note 34, at 264. 
60 See THELIN, supra note 34, at 263. 
61 See Pub. L. No. 346; National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. 
No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 401–
602); BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 230.  
62 See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 
(1965). 
63 See id.; Clark Kerr, Expanding Access and Changing Missions: The 
Federal Role in U.S. Higher Education, 75 EDUC. REC. 27 27–31 (1994).  
64 See 79 Stat. at 1233. 
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HEA ensures that loans are portable and usable at all eligible 
institutions.
65
 The other provisions of the 1965 HEA included 
support for developing institutions, funding for infrastructure and 
training for institutional libraries, as well as various amendments to 
the National Defense Education Act.
66
 The HEA symbolized a 
federal commitment to support for higher education beyond those 
projects that were in the direct interest of the federal government.
67
 
It marked the beginning of a legacy of student financial assistance 
aimed at providing what the Carnegie Commission termed 
―educational justice;‖68 it is a federal role that is not mandated by 
the Constitution, but rather by a commitment to democratic 
principles of social equality and a recognition that the higher 
education system could not accommodate widespread growth 
without financial support.
69
 
With the Higher Education Amendments of 1972 and 
subsequent amendments, Congress reinforced its commitment to 
providing aid to qualified college students as well as to colleges 
and universities.
70
 The current version of the HEA contains 
numerous programs designed to support higher education, 
including Federal Pell Grants, the TRIO programs, grants to 
support study of the sciences and engineering, and programs to 
promote international education.
71
 The HEA has shifted its focus 
on financing higher education from grants to loans over the past 
forty years; at the same time, it has become more accommodating 
to middle-income students, rather than solely aiding students ―of 
                                                        
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., 79 Stat. at 1224. 
67 See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 236. 
68 CARNEGIE COMMISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, THE PURPOSES AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: APPROACHING 
THE YEAR 2000 29–31 (1973). 
69 See 79 Stat. 1219. 
70 See Higher Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 
235 (1972); Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 
Stat. 1581 (2008). 
71 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070(a) (1998), 1022 (2008), 1122 (2008), 1124 
(2008); see also History of the Federal TRIO Programs, available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/trio/triohistory.html (last visited Mar. 
17, 2009). 
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exceptional financial need.‖72 
This brief history of Congress’ involvement in higher 
education no doubt leaves out significant pieces of legislation. The 
major developments detailed above are nonetheless sufficient to 
illustrate the fact that Congress’ approach to funding higher 
education has evolved over time by adopting strategies that proved 
successful in the past.
73
 Thus, the HEA borrows the idea of 
providing federal funds with strings attached from the Morrill Act, 
and it borrows the concept of portable, student-centered funding 
from the G.I. Bill.
74
  
Not only has the development of higher education policy been 
incremental and isomorphic, but it has also evolved in response to 
pressing governmental and societal needs. As a result, federal 
policies have often responded to immediate needs without 
contemplation of future ramifications. Although higher education 
researchers such as Martin Trow envision expanding access to 
higher education from ―elite to mass to universal access,‖75 
Congress may not have the ability to provide access for all 
students to all levels of higher education.
76
  
When Congress undertook the project of reauthorizing the 
HEA, modern policymakers faced the problem of a legacy that 
promised access without being able to provide it. Lobbying on 
behalf of students, universities and non-profit groups cried out for 
increases in the amount of Pell Grants and other forms of student 
aid, but these efforts have thus far proved but a drop in the bucket 
                                                        
72 See James C. Hearn, Access to Postsecondary Education: Financing 
Equity in an Evolving Context, in THE FINANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: 
THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE 439, 444–45 (Michael B. Paulsen & 
John C. Smart eds., 2001).  
73 See supra notes 31–72 and accompanying text. 
74 See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 
(1965). 
75 See Martin Trow, Reflections on the Transition from Elite to Mass to 
Universal Access: Forms and Phases of Higher Education in Modern Societies 
Since WWII, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HIGHER EDUCATION 243 (James 
Forest & Philip Altbach eds., 2006).  
76 See Fritz Machlup, The Illusion of Universal Higher Education, in THE 
IDEA OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 3 (Sidney Hook, Paul Kurtz, & Miro 
Todorovich eds., 1974). 
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as tuition at some institutions approaches $50,000 annually.
77
 The 
consumer-driven reforms included in the HEA are likely an 
attempt to address the problem of access to higher education 
without expending extra funds. The increasingly salient social and 
political themes of accountability and consumerism provide even 
more support for consumer-driven methods.
78
 
III.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONSUMERISM 
The landscape of higher education policy up to the 21st century 
is one with increasing support for, and regulation of, higher 
education, particularly in the area of equal access for all students.
79
 
Within that basic landscape, accountability and consumerism 
emerged as policy issues both in the university and public policy 
contexts. The desire for greater accountability and the increasing 
tendency to view students as consumers of higher education are 
both driving forces in the amendments to the HEA.
80
  
Accountability is a buzzword in both higher education and k-
12 these days, but the trend toward more government oversight of 
higher education started as far back as the 1960s.
81
 According to 
Jason Lane, the movement toward accountability was born out of 
public frustration with the student disobedience and protests on 
campuses during the Vietnam War.
82
 Lane describes the rationale 
for government oversight in the eyes of the Carnegie Foundation: 
―since colleges and universities were serving a public good and 
were supported through public funds, they should be held 
accountable to the public interest through state governments.‖83  
Although much of the oversight of higher education has been at 
                                                        
77 See Paul Basken, Pell-Grant Rise is not Enough, Leaders of Black 
Colleges Tell Spellings, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 21, 2007, at A17. 
78 See supra Part II. 
79 See infra text accompanying notes 80–104. 
80 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 
3078 (2008). 
81 See Jason Lane, The Spider Web of Oversight: An Analysis of External 
Oversight of Higher Education, 78 J. HIGHER EDUC. 615, 618 (2007). 
82 See id. at 617–18. 
83 Id. at 618. 
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the state level and focused on public institutions, the federal 
government participates in its share of oversight over both public 
and private institutions.
84
 The most basic level of accountability 
required by the federal government is accounting for the proper use 
of federal dollars.
85
 In recent years, however, accountability has 
become more complex; governments now seek to make 
universities and colleges accountable not only for their spending, 
but also for the quality of ―student outcomes.‖86 The extension of 
the scope of inquiry from merely the way in which money is spent 
to the quality of the outcomes generated by the additional funding 
reflects the growing tendency to look at students as consumers of a 
product, and at higher education as a product whose quality can be 
objectively measured. 
Perhaps coincidentally—or perhaps not—the movement 
toward consumerism arose during the period after the G.I. Bill, 
particularly in the 1960s.
87
 The rise of consumerism can be traced 
both to changes in the way students approach higher learning and 
changes in the way universities undertake the recruitment and 
retention of students.
88
 According to David Riesman, the 
traditional, pre-G.I. Bill relationship among professors and 
students was characterized by faculty hegemony, but the influx of 
non-traditional veteran students set the stage for change.
89
 These 
students were older, more focused on vocational preparation, and 
more willing to question the authority of professors.
90
 Around the 
same time, student activists changed the relationship between 
                                                        
84 See id. at 618; see also James Fredericks Volkwein & Shaukat Malik, 
State Regulation and Administrative Flexibility at Public Universities, 38 RES. 
IN HIGHER EDUC.17, 17–19 (1997). 
85 See Robert Berdahl & T.R. McConnell, Autonomy and Accountability: 
Who Controls Academe?, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 71, 78 (Philip Altbach et al. eds., 1999). 
86 See Ami Zusman, Issues Facing Higher Education in the Twenty-First 
Century, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
109, 138 (Philip Altbach et al. eds., 1999). 
87 See generally DAVID RIESMAN, ON HIGHER EDUCATION: THE ACADEMIC 
ENTERPRISE IN AN ERA OF RISING STUDENT CONSUMERISM (1998). 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
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students and the administration by leveraging their power as 
tuition-payers to force universities to live up to ideals of fairness, 
equality and justice.
91
 Together, both veterans and activist students 
challenged the traditional subordination of students to the 
academic system.
92
  
Dropping enrollments also put pressure upon colleges to recruit 
students more effectively. One response to this challenge was to 
cater to the desires of prospective students in order to entice 
enrollees.
93
 Martin Trow deduces another source of consumerist 
attitudes in the simple fact that the trend toward mass higher 
education in recent years made the college diploma an obligatory, 
rather than voluntary, credential, creating more options for students 
and giving them more choice as to where to attend.
94
 The sum of 
all these circumstantial forces on higher education created a policy 
environment in which the relationship between student and college 
is increasingly thought of as one in which students are entitled to 
choice and value in the asset for which they are paying (the college 
degree).  
The notion that students need consumer protection measures to 
improve their relationships with colleges and universities combines 
both the student-consumer metaphor and increased interest in 
accountability.
95
 According to Joan Stark, the federal investment in 
student financial aid in 1965 generated increased attention by 
lawmakers in abuses perpetrated by colleges against both students 
and the government.
96
 Partly to protect the federal investment, and 
partly to protect students, policymakers instituted a ―truth in 
advertising‖ model of regulation to ensure that students received 
quality information.  
Today, students demand more choice and flexibility from 
universities, and institutions are willing to acquiesce.
97
 When their 
                                                        
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See generally RIESMAN, supra note 87. 
94 Martin Trow, supra note 75. 
95 See JOAN S. STARK, THE MANY FACES OF EDUCATIONAL CONSUMERISM 
3 (1977). 
96 See id. at 3, 32. 
97 See RIESMAN, supra note 87. 
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expectations are not met, students and parents do not hesitate to 
seek recourse outside the university by appealing to the court 
system. A recent example of this can be found at Wheaton College 
in Massachusetts, where a parent has filed a lawsuit over the price 
of attendance at a study abroad program arranged for students by 
the college.
98
 Courts have reinforced this consumer mentality by 
inferring a contractual relationship between the student and 
college, using the academic handbook as the terms of the 
agreement.
99
  
The trends toward increased accountability to the federal 
government and increasing attention to the student’s role as 
consumer both entail a notion of quality that is often overlooked, 
but exceedingly problematic. Both legislators and consumers 
expect colleges and universities to provide quality educational 
opportunities and ―positive‖ outcomes for students.100 Yet the field 
of postsecondary education in the United States is so broad and 
varied that it is difficult to identify what characteristics define 
quality.
101
 In the past, the federal government has sidestepped the 
issue of quality by requiring states to come up with their own 
standards of quality.
102
 In the new version of the HEA, Congress 
again skirts the issue of quality by providing consumers with 
copious information and leaving it up to individuals to make their 
                                                        
98 See Brady v. Wheaton Col., No. 0834-CV-133 (Mass. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 
8, 2008), available at  http://www.sutherland.com/file_upload/JamesBradyv 
WheatonCollege.pdf; see also Karin Fischer, Tuition Lawsuit Puts Study-Abroad 
Practices in the Spotlight, Again, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 22, 2008, at A20. 
99 See Jamieson v. Vatterott Educ. Ctr., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160 
(D. Kan. 2007); Harman v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., No. 03-CV-788-C, 2006 
WL 861269, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2006).  
100 See Zusman, supra note 86, at 121–22. 
101 See id. 
102 See e.g., Higher Education Act of 1965 § 202(d) (last official version at 
20 U.S.C. § 1022(d)(1) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 205, 122 
Stat. 3078, 3147 (2008)); Higher Education Act of 1965 § 203(d) (last official 
version at 20 U.S.C. § 1023(d)(1) (2006) (consolidated into current 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1022 (2008) by Pub L. No. 110-315 § 201(2), 122 Stat. 3078, 3133 (2008)); 
U.S. Department of Education, Four Pillars of NCLB, http://www.ed.gov/ 
nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
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own determinations as to quality.
103
  
The trends identified here—accountability, consumerism, and 
consumer protection—bear directly on the new amendments to the 
HEA.
104
 Although these trends came into being in the 1960s and 
1970s, they were never more present than they are today: money is 
tight, both for governments and families, and value, efficiency, and 
choice are on the minds of consumers and policy makers.
105
 It took 
the influence of Margaret Spellings’ Commission on the Future of 
Higher Education to translate these buzzwords into a call to action, 
one that set in motion the key provisions of the HEA 
amendments.
106
 
IV.  THE SPELLINGS COMMISSION REPORT  
In 2006, the Department of Education convened a National 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education. Often referred to 
as the Spellings Commission—named for then-Secretary of 
Education Margaret Spellings
107—the Commission was charged 
with the task of ―developing a comprehensive national strategy for 
postsecondary education that will meet the needs of America’s 
diverse population and also address the economic and workforce 
needs of the country’s future.‖108 One year later, the Commission 
released a report that was a call to action for education 
policymakers and higher education leadership and proved to be a 
harbinger of change in educational policy.
109
 The report is marked 
                                                        
103 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1022(d) (2008), Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 205, 122 Stat. 
3078, 3147 (2008). 
104 See id. 
105 See Zusman, supra note 86, at 137–39. 
106 See infra Part IV. 
107 A National Dialogue: The Secretary of Education’s Commission on the 
Future of Higher Education, http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/ 
hiedfuture/index.html (last visited July 14, 2008). 
108 Press Release, Secretary Spellings Announces New Commission on the 
Future of Higher Education (Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.ed.gov 
/news/pressreleases/2005/09/09192005.html. 
109 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP: 
CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION (2006) [hereinafter U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP]. 
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by its focus on the concepts of accountability, costs, quality, and 
the role of students as consumers.
110
 
The Spellings Commission report, released in September 2006, 
was both an analysis of the state of higher education and a series of 
recommendations for shaping its future.
111
 The report identified the 
primary challenges for higher education, including gaps in access 
for minority and low-income students, the increasing cost of 
college, and the lack of reliable and clear information about how 
colleges and universities do business.
112
 The report stated that 
access to higher education was limited, particularly for low-income 
Americans and minority groups.
113
 The factors that contributed to 
this limitation were ―the complex interplay of inadequate 
preparation, lack of information about college opportunities, and 
persistent financial barriers.‖114  
Compounding these obstacles to access, the report stated, were 
the rising costs of tuition and the decline of state subsidies.
115
 The 
Spellings Commission framed the problem of affordability not 
simply as a concern for individual students and families, but also 
as a concern for the government, because consumers pay only a 
portion of the cost of supporting higher education and the rest is 
left up to public and private donors.
116
 The Commission also found 
that the financial aid system was too complex and therefore 
inadequate to meet the needs of students.
117
 Regarding existing 
measures of accountability, the Commission found that the 
information collected was primarily centered on the use of 
financial resources and was therefore insufficient to give 
                                                        
110 See Elizabeth Redden, Accountability and the Applicant, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/26/ 
information. 
111 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF 
LEADERSHIP, supra note 109. 
112 See id. at 7–16. 
113 Id. at 8–9. 
114 Id. at 8. 
115 Id. at 10–11. 
116 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra 
note 109, at 10–11.   
117 Id. at 12. 
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policymakers and students information about the quality of 
outcomes which are, in the Commission’s mind, the real measure 
of institutional performance.
118
 
The solution to facing these challenges can be found in the 
Commission’s many recommendations, with an emphasis on 
accountability.
119
 The report stated, ―Every one of our goals, from 
improving access and affordability to enhancing quality and 
innovation, will be more easily achieved if higher education 
institutions embrace and implement serious accountability 
measures.‖120 It is apparent from the suggestions made in the 
report that the Commission envisioned accountability not just as 
reporting to legislators and other policymakers, but also making 
information available to the general public.
121
 The report called for 
wide-ranging information-sharing not only with legislators, but 
also with families and students.
122
 To that end, the Commission 
advised the creation of sources of easily searchable and 
comparable ―consumer-friendly information‖ on higher 
education.
123
  
The appeal of bringing consumers into the accountability 
equation is not readily discernible from the Spellings Commission 
report, but one may hazard a guess based purely on logic and past 
policies. As discussed in the previous section, federal and state 
governments are interested in accounting not only for money spent, 
but also for the value added by that money and the effectiveness of 
its use as measured by student outcomes.
124
 Yet in order to 
determine that institutions are spending money well or that the cost 
of an education is justified, federal and state governments must 
make their expectations clear.
125
 Historically, the federal 
                                                        
118 See id. at 14–15. 
119 See id. at 21–25. 
120 Id. at 21. 
121 See id. at 20–21. 
122 See id. at 20–21. 
123 See id. at 20. 
124 See supra Part III and accompanying text. 
125 See Douglas Bennett, Assessing Quality in Higher Education, 87 
LIBERAL EDUC. at 3 (2001), available at http://www.earlham.edu/~pres/ 
documents/pdf/01-02-assessingquality-text.pdf. 
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government has shied away from setting education standards or 
assessing outcomes due to federalism concerns. Even in k-12 
education, the federal government skirted the issue of outcomes by 
allowing states to set up their own testing and curriculum 
standards.
126
 Although the Spellings Commission identified 
―student access, retention, learning and success, educational 
costs . . . and productivity‖ as ―benchmarks of institutional 
success,‖ it did not set specific standards to measure adequate 
learning, access, or costs.
127
 By relying on consumers to regulate 
the cost and quality of higher education, the federal government 
can relieve itself of this pressure, as well as avoid the difficulties of 
implementation and compliance that would arise at both the state 
and institutional level. 
The Spellings Commission report raised the issue of combating 
rising costs and gaps in enrollment for minorities and low-income 
students by expanding measures of accountability.
128
 Although a 
report commissioned by the Department of Education did not 
necessarily have any bearing on the course of action chosen by 
Congress, the national attention that the report received likely 
helped to raise the profile of its policy recommendations.
129
 The 
following section describes the changes to the HEA made in the 
2008 reauthorization,
130
 which reflect Congress’ adaptation of the 
Spellings Commission’s conclusions about the state of higher 
education and the most expedient solutions to its problems.
131
 
                                                        
126 See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 
115 Stat. 1425 (holding states accountable for improving the academic 
achievement of students). 
127 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra note 109, at 
14. 
128 See id. at 18–19. 
129 See Paul Basken, A Year Later, Spellings Report Still Makes Ripples, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 28, 2007, at A1; Kelly Field, Uncertainty Greets 
Report on Colleges by U.S. Panel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 1, 2006, at A1; 
Spellings: Commission Is the Beginning of ‘Long Overdue Reform’, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 6, 2006, at A23. 
130 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
131 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
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V.  NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE HEA 
The issues raised by the Spellings Commission report are 
echoed in the amendments to the HEA that were passed on August 
14, 2008.
132
 Although it is clear that the primary method of support 
for higher education will remain financial, the bill increases 
accountability to both the federal government and to the public 
through a series of consumer-oriented protections.
133
 This section 
will describe the provisions of the bill and the intended 
consequences of them, as articulated by legislators themselves.
134
 
The reauthorization bill, entitled the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act, contains several sections that aim to increase the 
quality or availability of information to students.
135
 Sections 110 
and 111 of the Higher Education Opportunity Act amend chapter 
28, part C of the existing HEA, entitled ―Cost of Higher 
Education.‖136 Part C of the Act mandates collection of data in the 
―Improvements in Market Information and Public Accountability 
in Higher Education‖ program, in which the Commissioner of 
Education Statistics collates information on institutional 
expenditures, characteristics of student aid recipients, and other 
subjects.
137
 The new sections would augment efforts toward 
disseminating information and providing for public accountability 
by requiring more reporting and publication of information 
regarding college tuition prices.
138
  
Section 110 of the HEA amendments is titled ―Improved 
information concerning the Federal student financial aid 
website.‖139 This section generally requires the U.S. Department of 
                                                        
132 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 
3078 (2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).  
133 See, e.g., id. §§ 106, 110–15, 120, 488–90, 122 Stat. at 3090–3305. 
134 See infra text accompanying notes 135–85. 
135 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315 §§ 110–13, 
115, 120, 122 Stat. 3078, 3094–117 (2008) (to be codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
136 See id. §§ 110–11, 122 Stat. at 3094–107. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. § 110(a), 122 Stat. at 3094–95 (2008). 
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Education to promote use of the federal student financial aid 
website (studentaid.ed.gov) by displaying a link to that site from 
the Department of Education’s main website and by continual 
improvement of the information available on the site and the 
dissemination of that information.
140
 Section 110 also includes 
requirements to provide additional financial aid information 
specifically for military members and veterans.
141
 
Section 111 also looks to improve the availability of 
information to students and parents, but it focuses on financial 
information.
142
 The section requires a variety of lists and 
calculators that would allow consumers to get estimates of tuition 
and net cost of attendance. The proliferation of lists required under 
this section is due to the fact that the legislative compromise 
combined the proposals from both the House and Senate rather 
than paring down the number of lists.
143
 As a result, § 111 requires 
the Secretary of Education to make available through the College 
Navigator (Department of Education’s college search database): 
  A list of the top five percent of institutions in each 
category (four-year public, four-year private non-profit, 
four-year private for-profit, two-year public, etc.) whose 
tuition and fees are highest for the most recent year; 
  A list of the top five percent of institutions in each 
category whose net prices are the highest for the most 
recent year; 
  A list of the top five percent of institutions in each 
category that have had the largest percentage change in 
tuition and fees over the most recent three years; 
  A list of the top five percent of institutions in each 
category that have had the largest percentage change in net 
price over the most recent three years; 
  A list of the top ten percent of institutions in each 
                                                        
140 See id. 
141 See id. § 110(b), 122 Stat. at 3095–98. 
142 See id. § 111, 122 Stat. at 3097–108. 
143 See Doug Lederman, Emerging Higher Ed Act Compromise, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED, May 13, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/ 
05/13/hea. 
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category with the lowest tuition and fees for the most recent 
year; and 
  A list of the ten percent of institutions in each category 
with the lowest net price for the most recent year.
144
 
Institutions among the top five percent of increases in tuition 
and net price in each category must submit an explanation to the 
Secretary of Education as well as a plan for decreasing costs.
145
 
These explanations will be made public to consumers through an 
annual report.
146
  
The ―Net Price Calculator‖ is another innovation contained in 
§ 111.
147
 The Secretary of Education is charged with the task of 
creating a net price calculator that will help individuals estimate 
the net price of attendance at a particular institution.
148
 Net price is 
defined as ―the average yearly price actually charged to first-time, 
full-time undergraduate students receiving student aid at an 
institution of higher education after deducting such aid,‖149 but the 
Net Price Calculator should take into account the individual 
student’s need-based and merit-based aid ―as much as 
practicable.‖150 No later than two years after the Secretary 
develops such a calculator, higher education institutions that 
receive federal funds for student financial assistance are required 
to post a Net Price Calculator on their websites.
151
 The bill also 
calls for the Secretary of Education to develop a ―Multi-Year 
Tuition Calculator‖ that will help parents and students estimate the 
cost of tuition over an extended period based upon the annual 
percentage change in tuition over the most recent three years.
152
 
The final major change contained in § 111 is the ―Consumer 
Information‖ section, which pertains to the information made 
                                                        
144 Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 111, 122 
Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1015). 
145 See id.  
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
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available to the public through the College Navigator website.
153
 
The College Navigator allows users to search for colleges based 
upon geographical area, majors, level of degree offered, or 
institution type. Users may then compare institutional 
characteristics such as student population, tuition and fees, 
admissions requirements, and other criteria.
154
  
The HEA amendments essentially codify the data collection 
and dissemination already in use through the College Navigator.
155
 
Some of the data required includes: a statement of institutional 
mission; the number of students enrolled disaggregated by 
residency, race and ethnicity; degree completion rates; cost of 
attendance; average amount of grant-based aid awarded to first-
time, full-time undergraduates; the average amount of federal 
student loans provided to undergraduate students; and the 
percentage of first-time, full-time undergraduates receiving student 
financial assistance.
156
 One new addition to the College Navigator 
will be the availability of a list of institutions that participate in 
federal student financial aid programs, including each institution’s 
tuition and fees and net price for the three most recent years, as 
well as the net price disaggregated by student income.
157
  
Sections 110 and 111 contain many of the substantive 
provisions related to the collection and dissemination of 
information, but there are additional substantive provisions 
scattered throughout the HEA amendments.
158
 Most of these 
additional provisions are included to provide parents and students 
                                                        
153 See id. 
154 National Center for Education Statistics, College Navigator, 
http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
155 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 111, 122 
Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015); 
College Navigator, supra note 154. 
156 See Higher Education Opportunity Act § 111. 
157 See id. Student income is divided up into categories: $0–30,000; 
$30,001–48,000; $48,001–75,000; $75,001–110,000; $110,000 and more. See 
id. 
158 See id. §§ 434, 435, 488–90, 1021, 1022, 122 Stat. at 3247, 3252, 3293–
3306, 3483, 3488. 
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with more and better information about student loans.
159
 For 
example, § 433 requires lenders to provide borrowers with a 
disclosure of the name and address of the lender, the principal 
amount of the loan, the amounts of any fees, the loan interest rate, 
and a projected monthly payment, as well as several other pieces of 
information about repayment.
160
 Also, § 490 commits the Secretary 
of Education to the development of a program of early intervention 
and outreach that would provide students and families with ―early 
information about financial aid and early estimates of such 
students’ eligibility for financial aid from multiple sources.‖161  
The sections of the proposed HEA amendments described here 
represent only a small portion of the entire bill.
162
 The other 
sections cover Department of Education oversight of accreditation 
agencies, requirements that states maintain their financial support 
of higher education, better reporting of the price of textbooks 
required for courses, and of course student financial aid.
163
 That 
said, the programs highlighted here deserve special attention 
because they represent a new effort to improve access to higher 
education through the dissemination of information about costs and 
quality. While this new emphasis is clear in the text of the bill, it is 
further buttressed by legislators’ public comments about the bill.164 
Representative Buck McKeon wrote an op-ed piece for Inside 
Higher Ed that decried ―hyperinflationary‖ college prices and 
increasing taxpayer contributions without adequate 
accountability.
165
 McKeon claimed that the amendments to the 
HEA would remedy this with ―strong consumer-driven disclosure 
                                                        
159 See id. 
160 See id. § 433, 122 Stat. at 3247. 
161 Id. § 490,122 Stat. at 3305. 
162 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 
3078 (2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
163 See generally id. 
164 See H.R. 4137, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 1642, 110th Cong. (as passed by 
Senate, July 24, 2007); infra text accompanying notes 165–78. 
165 Howard P. McKeon, Real Progress (Finally) on College Affordability, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/ 
views/2008/02/07/mckeon (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). 
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and meaningful data comparisons.‖166 Although the availability of 
data is not a direct panacea for rising costs, McKeon explains that 
he expects that better information will lead to better decisions, and 
better decisions will in turn lead to better quality.
167
 As a result, 
according to McKeon, ―higher education consumers will finally be 
given the information they need to start exercising their power in 
the marketplace.‖168 McKeon’s op-ed piece stresses the idea that 
Congress is stepping up to the plate to deal with the rising costs of 
higher education and problems with accountability, but his 
description of the bill makes it clear that Congress actually expects 
consumers to step up to the plate.
169
 Rather than directly regulating 
cost and quality, based on McKeon’s statements and the text of the 
bill, Congress appears to be trying to remove itself from the 
regulation of the industry and instead assume the role of facilitator 
of better decisions in the marketplace.
170
 
Buck McKeon’s statements are consistent with those made by 
Representative Rubén Hinojosa, Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Higher Education. Representative Hinojosa 
identified the goals of the bill as: closing gaps in access and 
completion; improving the financial aid system; helping to prepare 
low-income and first generation students academically, financially, 
and socially for college;  and addressing the rising costs of 
college.
171
 Hinojosa identified the high cost of college education as 
the reason for gaps in access and completion, and the answer to 
college costs as the provision of public information, as well as 
accountability and incentives to states.
172
 
The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions report on the Higher Education Amendments of 2007 
                                                        
166 Id. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. 
170 See generally Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-135, 
122 Stat. 3078 (2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.); McKeon, supra note 165. 
171 See 154 CONG. REC. H625, H643 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2008) (statement of 
Rep. Hinojosa). 
172 Id. 
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states that the increase in college costs has made it impossible for 
students and parents to plan and save for college and suggests that 
increased access to information may remedy this problem.
173
 The 
report links the inability to afford college without significant 
borrowing to a decline in access for some students.
174
 The report 
further states, ―[t]he committee expects [cost and financial aid 
information] to help provide students and their parents with a 
realistic set of expectations about the cost of postsecondary 
education, as well as introduce some incentives for institutions to 
control the cost of attendance.‖175 The report clearly shows a desire 
to achieve better affordability and better access, but there may be 
another goal here as well.
176
 The report further states, ―[t]he public 
availability of this information is expected to support institutions 
and States that are committed to maintaining access to affordable 
higher education.‖177 This statement seems to indicate that the 
committee envisions the use of the data by the public as a way to 
promote competition among universities in such a way that those 
providing affordable education will benefit, and those whose prices 
are inflated or simply not affordable will find ways to cut costs and 
reduce prices.
178
 
This summary of the amendments to the HEA made through 
the Higher Education Opportunity Act shows that several 
significant provisions of the Act devote public resources toward 
the development of better systems for the dissemination of higher 
education information to the public.
179
 Much of the information to 
be collected and distributed has to do with the cost of a college 
education and the financial support available from the federal 
government.
180
 The other information collected and made public 
concerns institutional characteristics that might inform a student’s 
decision of where to attend, data that bears on what might be 
                                                        
173 S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13 (2007). 
174 Id.  
175 Id. 
176 See id. 
177 Id. 
178 See id.  
179 See supra text accompanying notes 132–78. 
180 See id. 
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considered ―institutional quality.‖181 Comments made by 
legislators during the process of developing the bill make it clear 
that they expect the widespread dissemination of information to be 
a solution to the rising cost of college.
182
 What is interesting is that 
it seems the expected effect of the information is twofold. In one 
way, it is expected that better information will help families be 
better able to plan and save for the payment of college tuition.
183
 In 
another way, though, it seems expected that by accessing good 
information about cost and quality, parents and students will make 
better decisions about where to attend, and the aggregation of 
many good decisions will ultimately drive down the cost of 
college.
184
 
The provision of better information may seem like a low-cost 
strategy with very little risk that has the potential for great reward 
in terms of cost-reduction and access to higher education. Yet the 
likelihood of success for such a program is unclear, and even more 
troubling, its likely effect on access is even less clear. Is it possible 
that providing information could make access to higher education 
even more unequal? The following section will discuss the 
potential implications of providing more information to consumers 
of postsecondary education.
185
 
VI.  THE MARKET FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
The notion that the higher education arena operates as a market 
is almost too obvious to be stated. A market is any situation in 
which sellers of a good or service convene with buyers of that 
good or service, or an area in which ―buyers and sellers negotiate 
the exchange of a well-defined commodity.‖186 However, the 
specific functioning of the higher education market is what is 
                                                        
181 See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 111, 122 
Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015). 
182 See S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13; see also 154 CONG. REC. H625, H643 
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 2008) (statement of Rep. Hinojosa). 
183 See S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13. 
184 See id. 
185 See infra Part VI. 
186 Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18, at 5. 
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difficult to describe.
187
  
In a perfectly competitive free market, the price of the services 
being sold would be determined between buyer and seller 
according to the laws of supply and demand.
188
 The fundamental 
conditions of a free market are that: no single competitor in the 
market is large enough to influence price; the products being sold 
by each seller are identical; there are no barriers to entry to, or exit 
from, the market; and, all participants in the market possess perfect 
knowledge of alternatives, prices and other relevant data.
189
 
Although no market is perfectly competitive, the ideal of the 
perfectly competitive market can be used in a predictive context 
for real-world situations.
190
 
Leslie and Johnson argue that higher education policymakers 
make decisions using a perfectly competitive model, with the 
assumption that their decisions will optimize efficiency and reduce 
costs.
191
 Nevertheless, the market for higher education is far from 
this ideal.
192
 The market tends to be distinct and different 
depending on geographical area, and the product being sold—an 
enrollment space—is qualitatively different from college to college 
and therefore of unequal desirability to different students.
193
 Leslie 
and Johnson further point out that although colleges and 
universities compete against one another, they do not compete over 
price; rather, they set their own prices and compete for students by 
adjusting the perceived quality of their product.
194
 
Under these circumstances of imperfect competition, 
policymakers nevertheless see incomplete or insufficient 
information as the source of the failure of a competitive market 
model.
195
 Some of the intended consequences of increasing market 
                                                        
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 6. 
190 See id. at 8. 
191 Id. at 9. 
192 See id. at 13–14. 
193 Id. at 14. 
194 See id. 
195 See David Dill, Through Deming’s Eyes: A Cross-National Analysis of 
Quality Assurance Policies in Higher Education, 1 QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUC. 
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competitiveness are better ―value for money‖ and spurring more 
innovation; others are better efficiency and quality.
196
 Public 
policy interventions into the market to create better competition 
tend to affect either: 1) the conduct of consumers and suppliers; 2) 
the structure of the market, including number and size of suppliers; 
or 3) the legal conditions under which the market operates.
197
 The 
public policy tools available to the government correspond to these 
three stages of intervention: regulation of price and quantity, as 
well as provision of information, may affect how conduct, taxes, 
subsidies and quasi-markets are used to modify market structure; 
legal adjustments such as anti-trust provisions or changing 
intellectual property rights can be used to alter the basic market 
conditions.
198
  
Leslie and Johnson describe the federal government’s interest 
in interfering in the higher education market as far back as the 
1970’s.199 They support their claim with evidence from position 
papers and policy statements from government officials,
200
 
including the following quote from a Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare document: ―The fundamental premise of 
this paper is that a freer play of market forces will best achieve 
Federal objectives in post-secondary education . . . . Accordingly, 
this paper describes what we should do to give individuals the 
general power of choice in the education market place . . . .‖201 It is 
evident that Congress’ early endeavors into increasing the power 
of student choice centered on ensuring that federal funding was 
largely in the form of aid to students, rather than institutions.
202
  
Dill, Naidoo and Jamieson show that the reliance on market 
                                                        
95, 98 (1995). 
196 David Dill, Higher Education Markets and Public Policy, 10 HIGHER 
EDUC. POL’Y 167, 172 (1997). See Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
197 See Dill, supra note 196. 
198 See id. at 172–76. 
199 See generally, Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18. 
200 See id. at 1 n.1.  
201 See id. at 2. 
202 See id. at 2; Brian Pusser & Dudley Doane, Public Purpose and Private 
Enterprise: The Contemporary Organization of Postsecondary Education, 
CHANGE: MAG. HIGHER LEARNING, Sept.–Oct. 2001, at 18, 21. 
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forces to cure the ills of higher education is happening all over the 
world.
203
 Although countries like the United Kingdom are 
deregulating to a more American model of higher education, 
researchers are cautioning against inflated expectations.
204
 In 
particular, the United States’ intention to assist competition by 
providing better information to students and parents about 
financing and quality may be misguided.
205
 The causal chain that 
carries better information to changing college prices and quality 
entails a long list of assumptions: that accurate measures can be 
created and disseminated, that students and parents will use this 
information in decision making, and that institutions will react to 
students’ enrollment decisions in a positive way.206  
It is easy to see from the research available on the marketplace 
for higher education that it is difficult to predict how the market 
operates. It is likely that legislators envision the market for higher 
education as something approaching a competitive market, and that 
they see imperfect information as the barrier to more perfect 
competition. Although in theory better information could lead to 
better choices and thus more competition among higher education 
institutions, this will not happen unless the assumptions mentioned 
in the previous paragraph prove to be true. Each of these 
assumptions must be researched in order to ascertain whether the 
amendments to the HEA contained in the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act will achieve the goal of creating better 
competition in higher education that will, in turn, reduce costs and 
increase quality. 
                                                        
203 See Dill, supra note 196, at 177; Dill, supra note 195, at 99; Rajani 
Naidoo & Ian Jamieson, Empowering Participants or Corroding Learning? 
Towards a Research Agenda on the Impact of Student Consumerism in Higher 
Education, 20 J. EDUC. POL’Y 267, 267–81 (2005). 
204 See Naidoo & Jamieson, supra note 203. 
205 See Dill, supra note 196, at 180–83; Leslie & Johnson, supra note 186, 
at 13–14. 
206 See Dill, supra note 196, at 180–83; Leslie & Johnson, supra note 186, 
at 13–14. 
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VII.  OPEN-MARKET PRECEDENTS IN EDUCATION 
The recent attempts to marketize higher education have 
precedent in both k-12 education policy and in the regulations 
governing teacher preparation programs.
207
 Scholars who 
documented the rhetoric surrounding the move toward 
―deregulation‖ closely followed the changing approaches to reform 
in each of these areas.
208
 This section will describe the changes in 
both teacher preparation policy and the reforms to k-12 education, 
as well as the research on both the process of reform and its 
effects. 
A. Teacher Preparation Programs 
During the 1990s, the federal government took a role in 
increasing accountability and quality in teacher preparation 
programs through the Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1996, 
the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA), and the 1998 amendments to the HEA.
209
 
The idea of inspiring a culture of public accountability in teacher 
preparation was ushered into the public policy arena by several 
public interest groups and a few key legislators.
210
  
Lora Cohen-Vogel and Hyland Hunt examined the way that 
policy regarding teacher preparation took shape by observing the 
contributions of advocates and politicians.
211
 Their analysis creates 
a dichotomy among policy advocates, distinguishing those who 
advocated for the ―professionalization‖ of teacher preparation 
                                                        
207 See infra text accompanying notes 209–72. 
208 See infra text accompanying notes 209–72. 
209 See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 
(1994) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Improving America’s 
Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6304 (2008); Higher Education 
Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (1998) (codified in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
210 See Lora Cohen-Vogel & Hyland Hunt, Governing Quality in Teacher 
Education: Deconstructing Federal Text and Talk, 114 AM. J. EDUC. 137, 137–
38 (2007). 
211 See id. 
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through better licensing standards, and those who supported the 
deregulation of teaching, emphasizing knowledge of subject matter 
content over pedagogical concerns.
212
 The teacher preparation 
legislation is more or less a compromise between these two points 
of view; it is ―deregulation‖ because it does not set federal 
standards of quality, but it ―professionalizes‖ by forcing states to 
maintain licensing standards and publicize the quality of its 
programs.
213
 
The Goals 2000 Act codified as a national goal access to 
teacher’s education programs that allow teachers to ―acquire the 
knowledge and skills needed to instruct and prepare all American 
students for the next century.‖214 The 1994 reauthorization of the 
ESEA followed through on this goal by providing support to 
teacher education program through additional funding.
215
 
Congress’ next step into the field of teacher preparation was the 
most intrusive; the 1998 Higher Education Act Amendments 
require reporting both by states and individual institutions that 
amounts to accountability to both the legislature and the general 
public.
216
 
The 1998 amendments offer grants to states and institutions to 
improve the quality of teacher education programs.
217
 The statutes 
do not clearly define standards of quality, but rather call upon 
states and institutions to prepare teachers who are ―highly 
competent in their academic content areas in which [they] plan to 
teach.‖218 They also emphasize state-level certification 
                                                        
212 Id. 
213 See Goals 2000: Educate America Act; Improving America’s Schools 
Act of 1994 §§ 6301–04; Higher Education Amendments of 1998. 
214 See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 
215 See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 §§ 6301–04. 
216 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 
Stat. 1581, 1759 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
217 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 112 Stat. at 1623. 
218 See, e.g., Higher Education Act of 1965, § 202(d) (last official version 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1022(d)(1) (2006)) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-314 § 205, 122 
Stat. 3078, 3147 (2008); Higher Education Act of 1965 § 203(d) (last official 
version at 20 U.S.C. § 1023(d)(1) (2006) (consolidated into current 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1022 (2008) by Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 201(2), 122 Stat. 3078, 3133) (2008)).   
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requirements, clinical experience, and professional development.
219
 
The provisions offering grants are immediately followed by 
requirements of accountability.
220
 To that end, Congress requires 
both states and institutions to submit report cards on the quality of 
teacher preparation.
221
 
Although states and individual institutions are required to 
submit ―report cards‖ to the Department of Education, so far only 
the institutional report cards must be made readily available to the 
general public.
222
 The only portion of state report cards that is 
required by law to be widely publicized is the percentage of 
teacher candidates who passed the state assessments, disaggregated 
and ranked by the students’ preparation program.223 The other state 
report card components, including a description of teacher 
licensing or certification requirements, the standards a teacher-
candidate must meet to pass certification or licensing requirements, 
and the alignment of the certification or licensing program with the 
state’s standards for students must be reported to the Secretary of 
Education.
224
  
The institutional report cards must include the percentage of 
the teacher preparation program’s students who passed the 
institution’s resident state licensing or certification exam within 
three years of completing the teacher preparation program, and a 
comparison of its pass rate with the average pass rates of other 
programs in the state.
225
 It also must provide a general description 
of the teacher preparation program, including the number of 
students enrolled, the hours of practicum experience required and 
the faculty-student ratio in the practicum experience, as well as a 
statement as to whether the program is accredited. The institutions 
also must publicize whether or not they have been designated as 
                                                        
219 See generally Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
244, 112 Stat. 1581 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
220 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 112 Stat. at 1759 
(reauthorizing the Higher Education Act of 1965, omitted 2009). 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
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―low-performing‖ according to standards set by the states in 
accordance with another provision of the HEA.
226
 
The amendments to the HEA substantially changed the way 
that teacher preparation programs are accountable to both the 
federal government and the general public.
227
 Now, one can search 
the Internet and find the institutional report cards of a wide array of 
teacher preparation programs.
228
 The Secretary of Education’s 
Annual Report on Teacher Quality documents the gains in quality 
in teacher preparation programs, but it does not differentiate 
among the potential causes of these gains.
229
 Neither that report 
nor any scholarly research shows whether public information about 
the quality of teacher preparation programs is used by applicants 
and whether it has had an effect on their decisions as to where to 
apply.
230
 
B. No Child Left Behind 
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)—a comprehensive 
education reform undertaken in 2001—has received much 
attention from the public and from education policymakers and 
practitioners. The Act is a mammoth piece of legislation that 
reauthorizes federal programs promoting primary and secondary 
education found in the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act.
231
 The revolutionary elements of NCLB are measures of 
accountability and free choice that force states to evaluate the 
educational preparation of their students, and give parents more 
options for choosing where their children will be educated.
232
 
The U.S. Department of Education states that No Child Left 
Behind is based upon four ―pillars‖: stronger accountability, more 
                                                        
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
228 Id. 
229 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE SECRETARY’S 
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON TEACHER QUALITY: A HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEACHER 
IN EVERY CLASSROOM (2006). 
230 Id. 
231 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6304 (2008). 
232 See id. 
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freedom for states and communities, proven education methods, 
and more choice for parents.
233
 Stronger accountability is achieved 
by requiring states to develop standards for academic content areas 
and use standardized tests to gauge how learning measures up to 
these standards.
234
 Accountability is also furthered by creating 
state and district ―report cards‖ that are not only made public, but 
also used to enforce penalties on under-performing districts.
235
 
Freedom for states and communities is encouraged by allowing 
states to redirect federal funds from one program to another.
236
 
The Act purports to promote ―proven education methods‖ by 
requiring that states implement programs and assessment methods 
that are proven through ―scientifically based research.‖237 The final 
pillar, more choice for parents, is supported by allowing parents of 
children in low-performing schools to transfer their children to 
better performing schools in the district or to public charter 
schools.
238
 Some parents in low-performing districts are also 
eligible for supplemental educational services.
239
 In all, the 
measures supporting the four pillars of NCLB encourage 
accountability to the state and federal governments, accountability 
to the public through the provision of information, and greater 
school choice for parents.
240
 
These measures of accountability and choice are part of the 
theme underlying the Act that public education may be improved 
by decentralized accountability coupled with competition.
241
 It 
                                                        
233 U.S. Department of Education, Four Pillars of NCLB, 
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html (last visited July 14, 2008). 
234 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, § 1111 
(2001). 
235 See U.S. Department of Education, supra note 233. 
236 See id. 
237 See 20 U.S.C. § 6314. 
238 See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b). 
239 See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(e). 
240 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6314, 6316(b), 6316(e); U.S. Department of 
Education, supra note 233. 
241 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–04; Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: 
Forging a Congressional Compromise, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? THE 
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 23, 24 (Paul Peterson & 
Martin West, eds., 2003). 
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may seem odd to think of public schools, school districts, and 
states as competitors, but in fact they do compete.
242
 Public schools 
do not necessarily have a monopoly on their district; they compete 
with public charter schools and private schools for students.
243
 
Students are not the only resource in short supply; districts and 
states also compete for money in the form of government grants or 
higher property taxes.
244
 
The stated purpose of NCLB is ―to ensure that all children have 
a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality 
education . . . .‖245 How was it decided that increasing choice and 
accountability would meet this goal? The ―checks and balances‖ of 
the legislative and executive branches and the adversarial two-
party system at work in Congress do not lend themselves to 
creating policy based upon a unified ideology.
246
 Rather, the 
ideology evident in NCLB is the product of legislative 
compromise.
247
 In the years leading up to its enactment, 
Republicans and Democrats differed markedly in terms of their 
approaches to education reform.
248
 Andrew Rotherham of the 
Progressive Policy Institute described the heart of these differences 
as ―the left’s habitual demand for more spending and the right’s 
incessant campaign to shrink Washington’s role in education.‖249  
                                                        
242 Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Competition Between Private and 
Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 33–34 
(1998); George M. Holmes et al., Does School Choice Increase School Quality?, 
2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9683, 2003). 
243 See Epple & Romano, supra note 242, at 33; Holmes et al., supra note 
242, at 2. 
244 See Holmes et al., supra note 242, at 1. 
245 20 U.S.C. § 6301. 
246 See generally David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided 
Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and 
Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373 (1996). 
247 See Rudalevige, supra note 241. 
248 See ELIZABETH H. DEBRAY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND EDUCATION: 
FEDERAL POLICY DURING THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS 27–37 
(2006). 
249 ANDREW ROTHERHAM, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, TOWARD 
PERFORMANCE-BASED FEDERAL EDUCATION FUNDING (1999), 
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/ESEA.pdf.  
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In the 106th Congress, House Republicans introduced 
Academic Achievement for All (The Straight A’s Act). This Act 
would provide unprecedented freedom for states by giving them 
the option to distribute federal education funds across programs as 
they saw fit; in exchange for flexibility, the states would have to 
meet higher accountability standards.
250
 Meanwhile, Democratic 
Representative George Miller was advocating better accountability 
by forcing states to use the disaggregated student data they collect 
as a basis for accountability frameworks; similar accountability 
proposals were made in the Senate.
251
 No Child Left Behind 
reflects a compromise between these disparate points of view; the 
Act increases accountability, but limits the federal role by forcing 
states to set their own standards and placing some of the burden of 
monitoring school progress on the public.
252
 It is out of this spirit 
of compromise, rather than any indication of feasibility, that 
Congress came to rely upon open market forces as a major factor 
in education reform.
253
 
After seven years of No Child Left Behind, researchers have 
only just begun to gauge the effectiveness of its provisions.
254
 The 
effects of No Child Left Behind may be instructive for evaluating 
the future of the higher education policies that rely on market 
competition and which are the focus of this review. The majority 
of the existing research has been on how academic achievement 
has been affected by state accountability requirements.
255
 This 
                                                        
250 H.R. 2300, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). 
251 See DEBRAY, supra note 248, at 47–48. 
252 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001). 
253 See DEBRAY, supra note 248, at 92–110. 
254 See, e.g., Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, Information, 
School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments, 
2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13623, 2007). 
255 See, e.g., Julian R. Betts & Anne Danenberg, The Effects of 
Accountability in California, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? THE POLITICS AND 
PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 197 (Paul Peterson & Martin West, 
eds., 2003); Martin Carnoy & Susanna Loeb, Does External Accountability 
Affect Student Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION & 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 305, 305–06 (2002); Eric Hanushek & Margaret Raymond, 
Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance, 24 J. OF 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 297–99 (2005) [hereinafter Hanushek & 
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particular area of NCLB does not really rely on market 
competition, so it is not all that instructive.
256
 Researchers have 
found that some state accountability plans have had positive effects 
on student achievement, and others have not; but only Figlio and 
Rouse give any indication that the improvement is related to 
market competition.
257
 Their study posited that the motivation to 
improve academic achievement at low-performing schools in 
Florida was stigma attached with the label of ―failing‖ or ―low-
performing.‖258  
A few studies have examined the impact of the increased 
choice provided by NCLB on student achievement.
259
 Jeffrey 
Weinstein and Justine Hastings estimate the impact of school 
choice provisions and publicizing school performance measures in 
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District.
260
 That district 
employed a school choice plan that allowed all parents to choose 
their top three choices.
261
 After evaluating the schools for NCLB 
performance criteria, however, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district 
notified parents of students at poorly performing schools and 
allowed them to resubmit their choice forms.
262
 Hastings and 
Weinstein compared the choices of parents at low-performing 
schools before and after notification.
263
 They found that 16% of 
these parents chose a different school for their child, and they 
                                                        
Raymond, Improved Student Performance]; Eric Hanushek & Margaret 
Raymond, The Effect of School Accountability Systems on the Level and 
Distribution of Student Achievement, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 406, 407–09 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hanushek & Raymond, Student Achievement]. 
256 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311. 
257 See David N. Figlio & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Do Accountability and 
Voucher Threats Improve Low-Performing Schools?, J. PUB. ECON., Jan. 2006, 
at 239, 253–54; Carnoy & Loeb, supra note 255, at 311–19; Hanushek & 
Raymond, Improved Student Performance, supra note 255, at 297, 309–14; 
Hanushek & Raymond, Student Achievement, supra note 255, at 406, 411–14 . 
258 Figlio & Rouse, supra note 257, at 253–54. 
259 See Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 254. 
260 See id. at 3. 
261 See id. 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
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chose schools that were, on average, higher performing.
264
 
Furthermore, the study found that students who were admitted to 
higher-performing schools than their original school did 
significantly better on achievement tests.
265
 
This and similar studies indicate that NCLB notification and 
choice requirements can have a positive effect on the achievement 
of students who exercise their choice, but they do not address the 
question of whether parental choice can have a positive effect on 
overall school quality.
266
 Caroline Hoxby acknowledges that, in 
theory, school choice can increase competitiveness among schools, 
rewarding those that have higher achievement per dollar spent.
267
 
Hoxby points out that school choice has long existed in American 
public schools, because people choose residential areas based upon 
local school districts.
268
 Charles Tiebout’s model of local public 
expenditures states that the choices made by residents influence the 
quality and amount of public goods offered by the local 
government.
269
 Hoxby attempts to ascertain the effects of Tiebout 
choice in order to shed light on the potential effects of school 
reforms that promote choice.
270
 She concludes that Tiebout choice 
appears to raise the productivity of public school districts by 
increasing student achievement while also lowering spending.
271
 
Although not conclusive on this issue, Hoxby’s study indicates that 
it is possible that school reforms that increase school choice could 
be effective in increasing quality and efficiency.
272
  
Without evidence that school choice increases the overall 
                                                        
264 See id. at 4. 
265 See Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 254, at 5.  
266 See, e.g., Justine Hastings, Thomas Kane & Douglas Staiger, 
Preferences and Heterogenous Treatment Effects in a Public School Choice 
Lottery 20–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12145, 
2005); Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 254, at 24–25. 
267 Caroline Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit 
Students and Taxpayers?, AM. ECON. REV., Dec. 2000, at 1209. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. 
270 See id. at 1209–10. 
271 See id. at 1236–37. 
272 See id. at 1209–10, 1236–37. 
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quality of public schooling, or that teacher preparation regulations 
increase the overall quality of preparation programs, these 
examples of the use of open market principles in federal education 
policy do not give any indication as to whether the promotion of 
market competition will benefit higher education.
273
 Still, these 
examples indicate that Congress has embraced the philosophy that 
competition is good for education, and it is likely that it will 
continue to produce policies that will rely upon the consumer’s 
awareness of the quality of educational options available.
274
 
VIII.  IMPLICATIONS  
The preceding sections have shown that the new amendments 
to the HEA mark a departure from Congress’ traditional reliance 
on student financial aid to widen access to higher education.
275
 
Although student financial aid and direct funding to higher 
education institutions remain central to the HEA, the new 
amendments contain a variety of measures aimed at increasing 
access to information about college, particularly about the costs 
associated with attendance and the financial aid available to 
students and families.
276
 These measures serve a multitude of 
government objectives. Chief among those are these three. First, 
Congress intends to help families gain access to college by making 
them more aware of its costs (tuition price and net cost), so that 
they can plan and save better to pay for college tuition, and also 
apply to institutions that offer better financial aid packages.
277
 
                                                        
273 See, e.g., Figlio & Rouse, supra note 257; Hanushek & Raymond, supra 
note 257; Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, supra note 266; Hastings & Weinstein, 
supra note 254; Hoxby, supra note 267; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
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274 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 
Stat. 1581, 1759 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (reauthorizing the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, omitted 2009); No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–04, 6311–16 (2008). 
275 See supra Parts II–VII. 
276 See, e.g., Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
315 §§ 110–15, 120, 488–490, 122 Stat. 3078, 3094–111, 3117, 3293–308 
(2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
277 See id.; S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13 (2007); 154 CONG. REC. H643 (daily 
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Second, policymakers seem to believe that if they provide 
information to consumers, consumers will be able to make better 
decisions that will ultimately drive the cost of higher education 
down by influencing price setting in a competitive market.
278
 
Third, the more expansive information collection and 
dissemination included in the amendments to the HEA will be 
available to policymakers as well as consumers; legislators will be 
able to use the detailed cost and affordability data to make higher 
education institutions accountable to Congress as well as the 
general public.  
Each of these goals is riddled with inherent inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. The first goal of increasing access by clearing up 
students’ and parents’ uncertainties about the cost of higher 
education and its net price after discounting financial aid is 
problematic for at least one major reason: no matter how useful the 
information is, it is worthless if parents and students do not access 
it and fully understand it. Studies of parents’ and students’ access 
to information about cost and financial aid are sparse and limited 
in scope, but they indicate that parents and students most often rely 
upon guidance counselors and publications from specific colleges 
or universities for information.
279
 Also, these studies show that 
higher income families and those in which a parent has attended 
                                                        
ed. Feb 7, 2008) (statement of Rep. Hinojosa). 
278 See Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 §§ 110–115, 120, 488–
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(2002); Alberto F. Cabrera & Steven M. La Nasa, On the Path to College: Three 
Critical Tasks Facing America’s Disadvantaged, 42 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 119, 
138 (2001); Patricia M. McDonough & Shannon Calderone, The Meaning of 
Money: Perceptual Differences Between College Counselors and Low-Income 
Families About College Costs and Financial Aid, 49 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
1703, 1704–05 (2006). 
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college are more likely to seek out multiple sources of information 
on colleges, whereas lower income or first-generation families 
seek only information from ―local‖ sources such as a teacher or 
guidance counselor.
280
   
It is unlikely that a large group of college-bound students 
currently seek information from the Department of Education, and 
it is also unclear whether students and families actually use the 
information in the way that Congress anticipated.
281
 A student 
from Brooklyn Friends School in New York said of the U.S. 
Department of Education’s College Navigator website, ―It gives 
you exactly what you’re looking for, but that might not be what 
you’re looking for if you don’t know what you’re looking for.‖282 
In order for the cost and financial aid information on the College 
Navigator site to be useful, a student or parent must use it to look 
up costs at a college, estimate the student’s likelihood to receive 
financial assistance in attending that college, and then either decide 
to apply to a more affordable college or university, or start a more 
effective plan to save for the cost of attendance.
283
 Of course, the 
estimated net costs and financial aid packages predicted using net 
cost calculators could prove to be inaccurate based upon family 
circumstances such as additional children in college or existing 
assets; this would make it impracticable to change one’s saving 
strategy based on the federal government’s prediction.284 
Moreover, existing research indicates that families are more likely 
to access this information during the last few years of high school, 
                                                        
280 See id. 
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on S. 1642, S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13 (2007); 154 CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed. 
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at which point it would be too late to accrue any significant savings 
to pay for college.
285
 
The second congressional goal of curbing rising tuition prices 
by helping consumers make better decisions is equally 
problematic. The circumstances that must come to pass in order to 
achieve an effect on the price of tuition are complicated. Not only 
must consumers consult and understand the information distributed 
by the federal government, but they must also use it to make 
―good‖ decisions about where to apply and attend.286 A ―good‖ 
decision presumably is based on more than merely the sticker price 
or net price of attendance. Rather, better decisions about where to 
attend would involve some measure of quality, weighed against the 
price of attendance;
287
 that is, which institution gives the best value 
for the dollar?  
Although Congress intends to produce plenty of information 
about cost, as discussed in previous sections, its work to improve 
information on quality is lacking.
288
 The College Navigator hosts a 
variety of data about college characteristics from graduation rates 
to enrollment statistics and majors, and the amendments add to that 
measures of quality such as student-faculty ratio and average SAT 
and ACT scores.
289
 Yet they do not include other relevant 
measures, such as job placement rates of graduates, average 
income of graduates, or measures of the quality of academic 
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Home Page, http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
MORGAN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:51 PM 
 CONSUMER-DRIVEN REFORM  575 
programs.
290
 And while independent ranking organizations such as 
U.S. News and World Report attempt to provide consumers with 
measures of quality, their methods have been criticized for serious 
flaws.
291
 If Congress balks at the idea of dictating measures to 
assess quality in higher education, and other sources of information 
about quality are insufficient, consumers are left with inadequate 
means to make better-informed financial decisions about where to 
attend because they lack the resources to accurately ascertain the 
quality-cost tradeoffs that are inherent in choosing an affordable 
college. 
The third and final goal of promoting the use of cost and 
financial aid information is the internal use of such data by 
policymakers to evaluate the efficacy of federal programs to 
reduce educational costs.
292
 Extensive data on tuition prices and 
the net cost of higher education may be helpful for serving this 
purpose, but fulfilling this goal may compromise others. It seems 
unlikely that the information a policymaker might need to 
determine whether colleges and universities are using federal 
dollars efficiently is the same that a consumer would need to select 
an appropriate college. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Walter Hobbs’ evaluation criteria for federal higher education 
policy served as the starting point for this discussion of the 
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consumer information provisions of the HEA.
293
 Hobbs stated that 
one must uncover the goals of a particular government regulation 
and evaluate whether those goals are legitimate and wise. Further, 
one must determine the probable consequences of such federal 
action.
294
 The Higher Education Opportunity Act amended the 
HEA by increasing the amount of information available to the 
public regarding higher education, particularly in terms of the 
sticker price and net price of higher education, as well as available 
financial aid.
295
 It is clear from both the evolution of federal higher 
education policy and the contents of the bill itself that the goals 
Congress seeks to accomplish are many, including greater access 
to higher education, alleviation of pressure to provide financial 
assistance (by both reducing tuition prices and helping families 
save and better plan to pay), and accountability for the use of 
federal funds.
296
  
It seems that these goals are all, to some extent, legitimate and 
wise, owing to their relationship to the democratic aims of social 
equality and wealth distribution.
297
 However, the consequences of 
supplying more cost and financial aid information to the public are 
entirely unclear.
298
 Neither the limited theoretical understanding of 
the operation of market principles in higher education nor the 
examples of market-based reform in k-12 and teacher preparation 
programs can predict whether better information will lead to better 
decision-making by students and parents.
299
 Congress cannot 
predict whether students and parents will use greater access to cost 
and financial aid information at all; moreover, it cannot predict 
whether they will use such information to plan and save more 
effectively, or to make better choices about where to apply.
300
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Also, there is no evidence to indicate whether the aggregate of 
individual decisions to attend lower-cost higher-quality institutions 
will actually result in changes in college tuition prices.
301
 
Obviously, it is unclear whether the consumer information 
provisions of the Higher Education Opportunity Act will achieve 
their intended goals. What is even more troubling, however, is the 
prospect that they may have unintended negative consequences. 
Social science research indicates that the new amendments to the 
HEA may serve to benefit only those people who are equipped to 
interpret the information that the federal government provides—
namely, high-income families and those families in which a parent 
has attended college.
302
 Congress purports to close the gaps in 
access that plague American higher education with this new 
legislation, but it may in fact only serve to widen the gap by giving 
some groups access to ―inside‖ information on institutions that 
offer high-quality education at more affordable prices.
303
 
In order to fully understand the value and consequences of the 
information provisions in the Higher Education Opportunity Act, 
patterns in parents’ and students’ use of cost and financial aid 
information must be investigated. At this point, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the information provisions contained in 
the Higher Education Opportunity Act will be either helpful or 
harmful.
304
 As the U.S. Department of Education struggles to 
comply with the informational mandates set forth by Congress, it is 
important to develop research and data that will answer the 
uncertainties identified in this Article: Who accesses cost and 
financial aid information supplied by the U.S. Department of 
Education? How do they use it? Do the choices made by college 
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consumers affect the price of services offered by colleges? Do 
consumers’ choices affect the quality of services offered? A clearer 
picture of how and whether financial information about college 
access is used can inform the process of HEA implementation, and 
it can also shape future legislation that seeks to enhance college 
access. 
 
